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[Crim. No. 5035.

In Bank.

Jan. 26. 1950.1

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD ALBERT
HUIZENGA, Appellant.

)

[1] Criminal Law-Instructions-Circumstantial r.vidence.-In a
criminal case based ')n circumstantial evidence, a defendant is
amply protected by instructions that crime may be proven by
circumstantial evidence, but the facts and circumsta nCl:ls ;n
evidence must be consistent with each other and with defenu
ant's guilt, :..lust be inconsistent with any reasonable theory
of his innocence, and must show his gUllt beyond a reasonllble
doubt; that if the evidence is susceptible of twa interpretll tlOns,
each of which appears to be reasonable, one pOlDtiug to dE-fellu,
ant's guilt and the othl'r to !lis innocence, it is the j\4I'Y's duty
to adopt tha' interpretation which will .Hlmit of det'l'ndant'd
innocence and to reject that which points to bls guilt; and
that if one of the possible conclusions ::Ihould appear to be
reasonable and the other to be unreasonable, it would be tbe
jury's duty to adhere to the reasonable dedu('tion and to r"jl'ct
the unreasonable.
[2] Id.-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Where i:vidence is
Circumstantial.-It is not the function of 8 reviewing court to
determine whether the circumstances relied on to justify a
verdict of conviction might be reasonably reconcile~ with Ihe
innocence of defendant. The court must assume in favor I)f :
the verdict the existence of every f8('t that the Jury could 1'1'8sonably determine from the evillenc\: and then .letl'r1l1illl'
whether or not a reasonable jury could find defcndunt guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

[1] See 8 Cal.Jur. 371; 53 4m.Jur. 574.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminul Law,
Law, § 1327; [3) Homicide § 145(1).
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[3] Homicide-Evidence-Jircnmstantial Evidence.-A convicti
of tint degree murder was supported by circumr.tantial evidene
from which the jury could reasonably be convincp.d beyond ,..
reasonable doubt that defendant killed decedent to obtai
pos'lession of his belo::lgings and money, where it appeared that
defendant, who occupied decedent's cabin, assumed ownership.'
of decedent's goods immediately aftel' his disappearance; o.e-=1.'
fendant Jug the latrine in which decedent's bloody belongings~
were found, sold decedent's :;oods, and lied when QUestioned
about it; the headboard of the bunk which decedent had used,;
and blankets found on the bunk, were stained with human
blood; the rope found in the cabin 'Vas the same type as that,,1
used to tie the ankles of decedent's body; the ",lade of a small :i
hatchet found in the cabin fitted the wounds ('n decedent's':
neck "almost perfectly": and a bottle containing the sum:;
that defendant specified as the amount stolen from decedent ~
was found buried in the floor' of the shack.
.

1:.
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APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Oode, §1239{1
from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of Sacramento Oounty .\
and from an order denying a new trial. Raymond T. Ooughlin, I
Judge. A f f i r m e d . .
1
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
death penalty, affirmed.
Elvin F. Sheehy. Public Defender, and Clarence H. Pease
for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier,
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRA YNOR, J .-Edward Albert Huizenga was convicted
by a jury of first degree murder and has been sentenced to
death. On this appeal from the judgment under Penal
Code. section 1239 (b)' the sole issue is whether the evidence
is sufficient to justify the conviction.
On January 18, 1949, the body of a male person was taken
from the American River east of the Jibboom Street bridge
in Sacramento Oounty. The body was headless, clothed
only in a suit of underwear, with the legs tied together at the
ankles with a piece of sash cord. Fingerprint records established the identity of the body as that of Arthur Paulson. On
January 24th, the decapitated head was found, and the identity of the body confirmed. The county autopsy surgeon,
Dr. Wallace, performed autopsies on the torso and head. Oil
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the right side of the head there were multiple small fractures
of the bones radiating in several directions. One piece of the
temporal bone abont an inch long had been driven into the
brain, presumably by a dull object. Dr. Wallace tt'stifit'd
that death had been caused by laceration of the brain, subdural
hemorrhage, and the multiple fractures of the skull.
On January 20th, defendant was found living in a tarpaper
shack that had been owned and occupied by the decedent.
Defendant stated, in answer to questions before trial and
while testifying on his own behalf, that he had known Arthul
Paulson since September, 1948. when they met while picking
tomatoes. They camped together east of the Jibboom Street
bridge until about the first of November. At that time. they
separated and went to different parts of the state where
harvesting was in progress. Defendant said that he returned
to Sacramento County about December 15th. He pitched camp
in the same area that Paulson and he had occupied during
September. The morning of December 17th, defend.ant met
Paulson, who invited him to move to the shack that Paulson
had constructed from tarpaper and wooden poles. Defendant
did not stay with Paulson that night but moved in with him
the following day. December 18th. Paulson slept on a bunk,
and defendant slept on boxing board laid on the dirt noor.
Defendant testified that Paulson went into Sacramento
on December 21st to obtain a lamp for his shack This testimony was corroborated by the witness Doucet, 8 neighbor
in the camp area, who met Paulson in Sacramento about noon.
Paulson was on his way back to the cabin with the lamp. He
was in good humor and did not speak of leaving the vicinity.
There is no evidence that he was seen alive thereafter except
by defendant.
Defendant testified further that when he returned to the
shac1,. early in the afternoon, after trying unsuccessfuly to
find work, Paulson was already there cooking. He looked
upset and acted queerly. When defendant inquired what was
wrong, Paulson told him that "on the way home he had been
strong-armed and robbed of $50.00. " Paulson told defendant
that he would not be in Sacramento the next day, that he was
going to Ventura for work. That night defendant and
Paulson read the newspapers and retired around 8 or 9 o'clock.
Early the following morning, December 22d, defendant
awoke when Paulson was building a fire. Paulson made up
his bedroll containing his blankets, a suit of underwear, and
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cooldng utensils and tied the roll with sash cord. Defendant
asked Paulson if he was going to store his property. Paulson
said he was going to take what he wanted and told defendant:
"You can have what I leave." Paulson had certain items of
property belonging to one William Allen that he told defendant to leave with Doucet if defendant left before Allen returned.
Later in the day defendant saw Doucet and told him that
Paulson had been strong-armed the prr.vious afternoon and
that $50 had been taken from him. Defendant told Doucet
that Paulson had gone to Ventura and that he took his bedroll
and his clock, leaving everything else for defendant. Doucet
visited defendant at the shack around 11 o'clock that morning.
He observed that a suit of Paulson's underwear was on the
line and that defendant was slicing bacon that had belonged
to Paulson. Defendant said that Paulson had left all his
food for defendant. Doucet observed defendant later constructing a latrine near Paulson's shack about 100 feet from
Doucet's.
On the same day defendant visited the cabin of Eugene
Belanger in the same area. He had not previously spoken
to Belanger .He told him substantially what he had told
Doucet concerning Paulson's being robbed, becoming disgusted, and going to Ventura. The following day, defendant
passed Belanger's camp with a rifle and a gunny sack and told
Belanger that he was going hunting. Belanger thought this
odd because the day was foggy and "you couldn't see fifteen
feet ahead of you." Belanger testified, however, that the fog
lifted around noon.
Doucet testified that two or three days after Decembe·r 22,
he observed defendant taking some of Paulson's clothes and
a suitcase out of the camp area. Defendant told Doucet
that he was going to put them in storage. The records of
Bill's Second-Hand Store in Sacramento, however show, and
defendant admits, that on December 23d he sold certain
articles belonging to Paulson. Defendant used the assumed
name, James Owens, and gave the address 1515 Fourth St.,
Sacramento, where he had previously resided. On December
29th, he sold a shirt of his own to the same store under the
same assumed name.
On or about December 24th, Doucet observed defendant
burning straw that he had taken from the bunk in the cabin.
He replied to Doucet's questioning that he was burning it
because the mice had been making nests in it. Defendant
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replaced the straw with three sofa cushions that be bad purchased after Paulson's disappearance.
Early in January, 1949, Earl King and two others con·
structed a cabin in the Jibboom Street jungle area about
100 feet from the one occupied by defendant. While they
were building, defendant went to them and told them that
the land was "private property or leased property." King
replied that he had as much right there as anyone else. Defendant said then, "Well, if you are going to build down
here, be sure and use my latrine," and from then on, King
and his companions did so. On January 18t)1, King discovered
the headless body, later identified by fingerprints as that of
Paulson, floating in the American River near the camp area.
On January 20th, three deputy sheriffs went to Paulson '.
shack, then occupied by defendant. When they questioned
him about Paulson, defendant explained Paulson's departure
as' he had previously to Doucet and Belanger. The officers
found a small caliber rifle, a small hatchet, and some sash
cord rope in the shack.
On January 21st, the deputy sheriffs returned to the jungle
area to search for the head of the body. Their attention was
directed to the latrine that defendant had constructed on the
day that, according to his testimony, Paulson had left for
Vcntura. After digging into the latrine about 2 feet, they
discovered a folded pair of dark trousers; a foot lower they
discovered a large bundle of clothing in an olive green
tarpaulin. The bundle included a large green blanket,
sleeping bag, dark coat, red checkered shirt, glove, and a
large blanket. These were identified by William Allen as the
property of or similar to the property of Paulson.
The officers also removed two sheet blankets from the bunk
in the cabin, and pieces of wood from the bottom and headboard of the bunk, which were marked with a reddish stain.
A clinical laboratory technologist, Roy B. Johnson, Jr.,
testified that the stains on the tarpaulin, the coat, and plaid
shirt taken from the latrine, and the two blankets from the
bunk, were human blood. Johnson found blood on the sleeping
bag and blanket taken from the latrine but was unable to
determine whether it was human blood. David Q. Burd, a
criminologist of the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation,
testified that the small hatchet found in the shack on January
20th, the pieces of wood taken from the bunk, another hatchet
MCoSd-U
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owned by Paulson, and a hammer left with Paulson by AII(>n
had blood of unknown origin on them. He testified that tIl,'
block of wood taken from the headboard of the bunk hlld
human blood on it. Dr. Wallace, the autopsy surgeon, t(>sti·
tied that the blade of the small hatchet titted "almost Iwrfectly" the wounds on Paulson's neck. He testified also
that the hammer part of the hatchet could have been used to
cause the fractures of the skull.
At the time defendant was questioned on January 21, 1949.
he was asked to tie a knot in the sash cord found in the
decedent's cabin. The knot that he tied was similar to the
!
knot in the rope around the ankles of the decedent's body.
Defendant was first tried in April, 1949, but the jury was .
unable to agree upon a verdict. Thereafter on April 22d
Deputy Sheriff Chapman returned to the site of the Paulson
shack, which had been torn down, to make a further investigation on his own initiative. He dug into what had been the !
dirt floor of the cabin and found buried there a small bottle '
containing $50 in currency. The next day Chapman returned
with two other deputies. After more digging they uncovered
four small pieces of newspaper that were identified as parts
of the Sacramento Union dated January 17, 1949. Deputy
Sheriff Munizich testified that the newspaper came from the
hole in which the bottle was found. Counsel for defendant
vigorously attacked the testimony given by Deputy Sheriffs
Chapman, Munizich, and Mason concerning their visit after
the first trial to the site of Paulson's shack. He said, ., We
contend that this case and the evidence produced herein' is the
result of planted evidence." There is no evidence in the record to support this contention.
In statements to the officers and in his testimony, defendant
consistently adhered to his original account of Paulson's departure and the reasons therefor. His statements and testimony varied as to the articles Paulson took from the shack,
and he admitted that he lied to Doucet about Paulson's taking
several articles that in fact he did not take. He offered the
explanation that Doucet was in the habit of "cleaning up"
after the former occupants had gone. Defendant at first denied
the sale of Paulson's articles to the secondhand store, but
after his handwriting had been compared with his signature
in the sale book, he admitted making the sale. He admitted
working on the latrine the day Paulson left and asking others
to use it, but he denied placing Paulson's property in it.
He has always denied that he killed Paulson.
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[1] The trial court instructed the jury that "Crime m8~'
be proven by circumstantial evidence as wel1 as by rlirt>et
evidence of an eye witness, but the facts and circumb1anees
in evidence must be consistent with each other and with the
guilt of the defendant, and inconsistent with any reasonable
theory of his innocence, and must show his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
"If the evidence in this case is susceptible of two eonstruetions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to be reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of the defendant,
and the other to his innocence, it is your duly, nuder the law,
to adopt that interpretation which will admit of the defendant's innocence, and reject that which points to his guilt.
"You will notice that this rule applies only when both of
the two possible opposing eonclusions appear to you to be
reasonable. If, on the other hand, one of the possible conclusions should appear to you to be reasonable and the other
to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to adhere to the
reasonable deduction and to reject the unreasonable, bearing
in mind, however, that even if the reasonable deduction points
to defendant's guilt, the entire proof must carry the eonvincing
force required by law to support a verdict of guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt."
These instructions afford ample protection to a defendant
in a case based on circumstantial evidence. (St>e People v.
Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 174 [163 P.2d 8]; P~oplt v. Green,
13 Cal.2d 37,44 [87 P.2d 8211.) Guided by tht'Se instructions,
the jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.
[2] Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
justify the conviction on the ground that it fl1ils to meet the
requirement (embodied in the first paragraph of the instructions quoted above) that" (r]esting its case upon circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must not only show a set
of circumstances consistent with guilt, but must show a set of
circumstances inconsistent with any reasonable theory of innocence." (The quotation is from opinion of Justice Prt>ston
in People v. Lamson, 1 Cal.2d 648, 653 [36 P.2d ~61J;
ct. People v. Perkins, 8 Cal.2d 502, 510 [66 P.2d 631J ; People
v. Newland, 15 Ca1.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778).) This contention confuses the function of court and jury by illlplyil1g
that if the court itself can formulate a rt'usonsble theory
of innocence from the evidence it must reverse a judgment
of conviction. It is not for the court, howe"er, to determine

I
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whether it can formulate such a theory. It must assume in favor
of the verdict the existence of every fact that the jury could
reasonably deduce from the evidence and then determine
whether or not a reasonable jury could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. "If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant
interference with the determination of the jury." (People v.
.Yewland, 15 Ca1.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778].) Thus, "the
rnle that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution
1l111st be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with an hypot hesis of innocence is a rule of instruction for the jury, and
is Ilot the rule for the guidance of the court on review." (PeopI c \'. Newland, supra, at page 682.)
"The functions of the jury include the determination of
thl' credibility of witnesses, thl' weighing of the evidence.
flllcl the drawing of justifiable inferences of fact from proven
fa!'ts. It is the function of the judge to deny the jury any
opportunity to operate beyond its province. The jury may
not be permitted to conjecture merely or to conclude upon
pnre speculation or from passion, prejudice or sympathy.
The critical point in this boundary is the existence or nonexilltence of a reasonable doubt as to guilt. If the evidence
is snch that reasonable jurymen must necessarily have such
a d01lbt, the judge must require acquittal, because no other'
result is permissible within the fixed bounds of jury consideration. But if a reasonable mind might fairly have a reasonable doubt or might fairly not have one, the case is for the
jury, and the decision is for the jurors to make. The law
recognizes that the scope of a reasonable mind is broad. Its
conclusion is not always a point certain, but, upon given evidence, may be one of a number of conclusions. Both innocence '.
and guilt beyond reasonable doubt may lie fairly within the
limits of reasonable conclusion from given facts. The judge's
function is exhausted when he determines that the evidence
does or does not permit the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt within the fair operation of a reasonable
mind." (Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232.)
[3] In the light of the evidence in this ease the jury could
reasonably be convinced beyond a rl'Rsonable doubt that defendant killed Paulson to obtain possession of his belongings
and money.
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Wben the witness Doucet met Paulson in Sacramento on
December 21st, 18 hours before he disappeared, Paulson
had just acquired a lamp for his cabin and gave no indication
that he was likely to leave Sacramento suddenly. Immediately after Paulson's disappearance the next day, defendant
assumed ownership of Paulson's goods, much of which Paulson would normally have carried with him while travelling.
The first morning after that disappearance defendant dug
the latrine in which the decedent's bloody belongings were
found. He encouraged others to use the latrine.
Defendant sold Paulson's goods under a fictitious name
and lied when questioned about it. He admitted selling the
goods only when informed that state experts had compared
the handwriting in the sales book of the secondhand store
and samples of his handwriting, and had found that they
were similar.
Two days after Paulson disappeared, defendant was seen
burning straw from the bunk Paulson had used. Defendant
admitted "cleaning up around" the bunk and burning
"reddish" paper that had been under the straw. A block
of wood subsequently taken from the headboard of that bunk
by the officers, and two blankets found on the bunk on January 21st, were stained with human blood. The rope found
in the cabin on January 21st was the same type as that
used to tie the ankles of Paulson's body. Wben defendant
was asked on January 21st to tie a knot in that rope, he tied
one similar to that used to tie the legs of the corpse.
The blade of the small hatchet found in the cabin titted the
wounds on Paulson's neck "almost perfectly." According to
the testimony of the autopsy surgeon, the hammer part of
the hatchet could have been the blunt instrument used for
the fatal blows.
A bottle containing the sum that defendant specified as the
amount stolen from Paulson was found buried in the floor
of the shack. In the same hole were newspapers dated January 17, 1949, three weeks after Paulson's disappearance on
December 22, 1948.
In the light of this cogent evidence we cannot say that a
reasonable jury could not find defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J. t Schauer,

J., and Spence, J. t concurred.
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